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Abstract 
This paper aims to integrate the theory of bank financial performance with the practice of bank ratings. The paper studies the 
effect of bank capital structure and financial indicators in Middle Eastern commercial banks associated with high and low 
ratings issued by Capital Intelligence (CI). The authors also investigate how bank capital structure and financial indicators 
can be differentiated between banks with high and low ratings, using the multinomial logit technique. A sample of 65 rated 
commercial banks from eleven countries is used. The article focuses on commercial banks in order to avoid comparison 
problems between various types of banks. The data is taken from the Bankscope database and covers the period of 1994-
2007. The results reveal that the financial indicators of the highly-rated banks are associated with decreases in the ratio of 
impaired loans to gross loans, the ratio of loan loss reserve to gross loans, the ratio of non-interest expenses to total assets, the 
ratio of net loans to deposits and short-term funding and the ratio of net loans to total assets. In contrast, these financial indi-
cators are allied to an increase in the ratio of non-operating income to net income, the gap ratio, the interbank ratio and the 
equity ratio. The robustness of the results is quite obvious since the financial indicators associated with highly-rated banks are 
the opposite of those associated with low-rated banks. In view of the findings, some policy implications can be drawn that 
may be useful for bank management and policymakers in the Middle East region. 
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Introduction© 
The interrelationships between bank credit ratings, 
capital structures, ratings and financial indicators 
have created an ongoing and interesting area of re-
search for many years. The rating of banks is always 
conducted by external rating agencies, which follow 
a usually unpublished methodology to assign a rat-
ing based on a bank’s financial indicators. There-
fore, the concern for the public and for investors is 
that the banks’ financial indicators that determine 
their ratings are not accurate. The banking business 
depends to a large extent on gaining the public con-
fidence that helps the banks to attract financial re-
sources (i.e., deposits) and invest those resources in 
profitable opportunities. In this case, public confi-
dence could be increased if the financial indicators 
associated with high ratings were disclosed. 
The relevant literature on bank ratings has included 
intermediary factors, such as a bank’s capital struc-
ture and credit ratings. The reason for the impor-
tance of capital structure is that it affects a bank’s 
Financial Strength Rating (FSR), given that the 
adjustment of capital structure is largely controlled 
by universal bank supervisory regulations such as 
Basel I and II. Therefore, since the sources of bank 
capital are regulated, FSR is also implicitly regu-
lated. This requires bank managers to design finan-
cial strategies that do not deviate from the regula-
tions and which help the bank to achieve a high 
rating. For this main reason, among others, this 
paper treats bank capital structure as one of the 
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determinants of FSR assigned by Capital Intelli-
gence (CI)1. The role of credit ratings is covered 
separately in the literature (Horrigan, 1966; Eder-
ington, 1985; Ederington and Goh, 1998; Gray, 
Mirkovic et al., 2006). The connection between 
credit ratings and FSRs is obvious. Banks that do 
not base their lending decisions on sound credit 
ratings end up with a cumulative bad debt that ne-
gatively affects their credit risk, and in turn a 
weakened FSR. In addition, a logical and strong 
relationship exists between credit ratings and bank 
capital structure. For example, high credit ratings 
motivate banks to extend credit lines, which may 
require them to secure financing sources, such as 
accepting more deposits, borrowing from other 
banks and/or issuing equity. It is clear that any 
change in these financing sources is likely to alter 
the bank’s capital structure. This paper examines 
this relationship by addressing the effect of credit 
risk, measured by financial indicators, on FSR, in 
an independent model. 
The next question that occurs is why we need to 
know about FSR in the Middle East region. The 
literature on the determinants of bank ratings is ex-
tensive and well-established for the developed 
economies (Poon, Firth et al., 1999; Poon and Firth, 
                                                     
1 CI has provided ratings’ services since 1985. Strong professionalism 
in providing valuable information to banks’ creditors on their financial 
strength distinguishes CI from other rating agencies. CI has developed 
two ratings for financial institutions: the FSR rating (assessing the 
bank’s intrinsic financial strength, soundness and risk profile, control-
ling for many factors related to the bank’s operating environment) and 
support ratings for banks (emphasizing the probability that banks would 
receive support from third parties in the case of difficulties). 
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2005; Pasiouras, Gaganis et al., 2006)1. In terms of 
bank ratings, the Middle East region is not as well-
recognized in the literature as developed countries. 
This is due to four main problems that have evolved 
over time. Firstly, Middle Eastern banks’ equity 
financing has mainly been obtained from the gov-
ernment. Secondly, since most of the Middle East-
ern banks were typically government banks, there 
was less need to assess their creditworthiness 
(Harington, 1997). Consequently, a disconnection 
was created between credit ratings and banks’ capital 
structures. Thirdly, the market forces that monitor 
capital risk were absent, since the stock markets 
were underdeveloped or even non-existent in many 
countries, and this led to less interest in bank rat-
ings (32.5% of commercial banks – 65 out of 200 – 
are rated)2. Finally, the opening and development 
of various stock markets in the region has encour-
aged many foreign banks to establish businesses 
there, driving the mostly unrated Middle Eastern 
banks to performance comparable to that of the 
rated foreign banks. 
It should be emphasized that the main objectives of 
this paper are to examine the relationship between 
FSR and bank performance in terms of financial 
indicators, and to investigate how bank capital struc-
ture and financial indicators can distinguish highly-
rated bank from low-rated ones. In this paper, we 
discuss the significance of bank capital structure 
decisions on FSR in the Middle East. To the best of 
the authors’ knowledge, limited previous research 
has addressed the relationship between credit rating 
and capital structure in developed economies, for 
example, the US market (Graham and Harvey, 
2001; Shivdasani and Zenner, 2005; Kisgen, 2006). 
We are not aware of any other studies that investi-
gate the significance of bank capital structure on 
FSR in the Middle East. In view of the findings, 
some policy implications can be drawn that may be 
useful for bank management and policymakers in 
the Middle East region. 
The methodology adopted by rating agencies to 
produce bank ratings does not reveal how financial 
                                                     
1 It should be stressed that this study differs from others in various 
aspects. Firstly, we examine the FSRs assigned by CI, in contrast to 
others who have investigated bank’s individual ratings and FSRs as-
signed by Fitch and Moody’s, respectively. CI is considered to be more 
specialized in rating banks in the Middle East region than the other two 
information providers. This is due to the fact that CI provides ratings for 
65 banks in the Middle East, while Fitch, for example, provides them 
for only fifty banks. Secondly, we are using a sample which is consid-
erably more comprehensive in terms of period, number of banks and 
current ratings rather than previous ratings. Thirdly, to the best of our 
knowledge, there are no other studies that have investigated which 
financial indicators are associated with highly-rated banks. Finally, we 
focus on the rating of Middle Eastern banks. 
2 According to the statistics of the CI, from which the authors obtained 
all of the data used in this paper.  
indicators are used3. Consequently, our methodol-
ogy provides a systematic and practical approach for 
using bank financial indicators to distinguish be-
tween highly and low-rated banks. This perspective 
is quite different from the other relevant studies in 
the literature, since it provides an answer to the fol-
lowing question: why does a bank’s rating matter? 
Additionally, of course, this approach should add 
value to the bank ratings and assist practitioners 
(bank managers) to formulate banking strategies that 
promote high ratings. The rest of this paper is organ-
ized as follows. Section 1 reviews the relevant lit-
erature. Section 2 discusses the research methodol-
ogy and data collection. Section 3 explains the em-
pirical results. The final section offers conclusions 
and areas for future research. 
1. Review of the relevant literature 
The authors divide the literature review into three 
main parts. The first discusses the financial determi-
nants of bank capital structure; the second discusses 
the financial sector in the Middle East region and 
the third presents empirical findings on the determi-
nants of bank ratings. 
1.1. Determinants of bank capital structure. Bank 
capital requirements are included in numerous legal 
frameworks with the aim of guaranteeing banks’ 
financial stability (Weber and Darbellay, 2008). The 
specific characteristics of banks explain why the 
theory of optimal capital structure is somewhat dif-
ferent for them than for non-financial firms. But 
simply, governments interfere in banks’ capital 
structures in two ways: firstly, by providing an un-
derpriced guarantee, such as explicit deposit insur-
ance or implicit guarantees of deposits and other 
liabilities, and secondly, through the regulators, by 
increasing the costs associated with capital levels 
that are considered insufficient. Naceur and Omran 
(2011) showed that bank capitalization has a posi-
tively significant impact on the net interest margin, 
cost efficiency and profits. They demonstrate this by 
explaining that excess capital allows banks to invest 
in more risky assets, in the form of loans or securi-
ties, and thus to generate a higher interest margin, 
which results in higher profits. 
Capital adequacy, as a buffer against losses and 
failure, is one of the main tools used to monitor 
banks. Many studies have shown that stiffer capital 
regulations, including the risk-based capital stan-
dard, are the key component of declines in loan 
growth which in turn eventually result in credit 
crunches (Wall, Larry et al., 1987; Furlong, 1992; 
                                                     
3 This was confirmed by contacting Capital Intelligence, which stated 
that the basis for giving a certain rating to a bank is not revealed either 
to the client bank or to the public. 
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Haubrich and Wachtel, 1993; Berger and Udell, 
1994; Brinkmann and Horvitz, 1995; Lown and 
Peristiani, 1996; Jacques and Nigro, 1997; Wagster, 
1999; Furfine, 2000; Rime, 2001; Naceur and Kandil, 
2007). The banking industry in the Middle East has 
different features to that in the G10 countries mean-
ing that both the Internal Ratings-Based (IRB) ap-
proaches and the standardized approach would re-
sult in higher capital requirements in the former 
region. This is due to the fact that the credit quality 
and credit ratings assigned to corporate borrowers in 
Middle Eastern markets are considerably lower than 
those in G10 countries. Besides this, banks in Mid-
dle Eastern countries face difficulties in implement-
ing the IRB approaches because they have not been 
adapted for the environment in such countries. 
1.2. Financial sector in Middle East region. In the 
last few decades, repressive policies have been 
adopted by various countries in the Middle East 
region (excluding the Gulf states) in order to stay in 
control of the money supply, as well as to serve 
some social goals, such as protecting financial insti-
tutions against usury practice by keeping the interest 
rates lower than the market rates in order to support 
the government debt at a lower cost. Such policies 
forced the banks to increase their reserve require-
ments, raise their credit ceilings and use selective 
credit allocation. Consequently, a non-competitive 
and segmented financial sector was created. This 
forced Middle Eastern countries to adopt a financial 
reform agenda, aiming to select better investment 
opportunities to improve productivity, mobilize 
savings, improve corporate governance, and allow 
the trading, hedging, and diversification of risk (Na-
ceur and Omran, 2011).  Nowadays, some countries 
in the region, especially the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) countries, have begun to concentrate 
their efforts, using privatization, enhancing bank 
regulation and market orientation, with the aim of 
producing a well-developed, profitable and efficient 
banking sector. 
In the late 1990s, the Middle East region was con-
sidered a bank-based economy, with banks control-
ling most financial activities. This forced many 
countries to adopt comprehensive banking sector 
reforms. Before this, most of the banking sectors in 
the Middle East were highly regulated and con-
trolled mainly by governments. The prudential rules 
and regulations imposed by the governments were 
initiated mainly to mitigate the economic downturns 
associated with financial crises, as well as to reduce 
adverse budgetary consequences for governments. 
In other words, the main purpose of such severe 
rules was to enhance the ability of the banks’ man-
agement to make wise investment opportunities 
(Murinde and Yaseen, 2004). 
In line with the recommendations of the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, the central 
banks recommended that banks raised their mini-
mum capital requirement to eight percent. In the 
same context, many countries in the region formu-
lated bank laws focusing mainly on the transparency 
and disclosure of their central banks’ activities. Cen-
tral banks’ most important activities can be summa-
rized as follows: (1) issuing banknotes; (2) main-
taining price stability; (3) managing gold and for-
eign exchange reserves; (4) preparing monetary, 
credit and banking policies; (5) supervising policy 
implementation; (6) supervising the national pay-
ment system; (7) recording and following up exter-
nal debt (public and private); and (8) making rec-
ommendations to the government regarding loans 
and credit facilities. 
For non-oil countries in the Middle East region, the 
structure of the banking sector can be illustrated as 
follows: the Egyptian government owns around 67% 
of the country’s total banking assets, meaning that 
Egypt has the highest percentage owned by the state 
(Naceur and Omran, 2011). Jordan and Lebanon, 
meanwhile, have no banks owned by the govern-
ment. Regarding the oil-producing countries, most 
of the banks in the GCC countries have a significant 
amount of financial strength and are well-capitalized 
(Jbili, Galbis et al., 1996). GCC banks tend to be 
family-owned with a moderate amount of state-
ownership and participation. Accordingly, pruden-
tial guidelines were set out by the GCC to regulate 
the launch of new banks in these countries and to 
reduce the probability of the failure of the banking 
sector. The guidelines cover such aspects as capital, 
capital reserves, a minimum age of ten years for a 
bank, licensing, monitoring licensed foreign banks, 
bank closures, and a minimum capital retention 
requirement, among others (Jabsheh, 2002). 
The Middle East is described in the literature as 
having bureaucratic and political problems, under-
developed financial markets, accrued opacity within 
the banking industry, a massive volume of non-
performing loans, and an inadequate regulatory, 
institutional and legal environment (Godlewski, 
2005). In addition, Rojas-Suarez (2001) identifies 
the main problems with Middle Eastern markets as 
capital regulation inefficiency due to a lack of data, 
accounting standards and rules, a poor reporting 
system and inefficient financial markets. Conse-
quently, Basel II is likely to increase the capital 
charges for Middle Eastern banks. Therefore, it can 
be concluded that the rating of banks is a significant 
issue in the region. FSR assigned by CI rating 
agency is used as an indicator of banks’ perform-
ance and strength. Thus, it would be of great benefit 
to economists and policy makers to determine the 
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main quantitative factors (financial indicators) that 
affect the rating assignment process, and in particu-
lar the main financial indicators that produce high 
bank ratings and thus a better and more developed 
banking system in general. It has already been noted 
that rating agencies do not publish their methodolo-
gies, and thus it is unclear to the public why some 
banks are assigned a AAA rating and other a CCC. 
In this study, we are trying to remove this gap be-
tween practitioners and the public. 
1.3. Empirical findings on the determinants of 
bank ratings. The relevant literature including few 
studies on bank ratings and bank financial character-
istics. Poon et al. (1999) used data from the year 
1997 for a sample of 130 banks from different coun-
tries. The main objective of their work is to identify 
the determinants of Bank Financial Strength Ratings 
(BFSRs) assigned by Moody’s within different 
financial, economic and political environments. 
They also examine whether the information pro-
vided by the BFSR is the same as that contained in 
traditional debt ratings. Their empirical results 
reveal that the BFSR provides similar but not iden-
tical information to that contained in traditional 
debt ratings (both long- and short-debt ratings). 
Their results also show that the effect of country 
risk on BFSRs is insignificant. This can be ex-
plained by the large similarity in banks’ financial 
disclosures across countries and the maintenance of 
minimum capital adequacy ratios required by the 
BIS. In addition, the study finds that profitability is 
positively related to higher ratings and that loan 
provision, risk and profitability are important de-
terminants of ratings. 
Poon and Firth (2005) conducted a study based on 
ratings assigned by Fitch in 2002 for a sample of 
1,060 banks in 82 countries. The study reveals that 
Fitch’s Bank Individual Rating (FBR) has signifi-
cant positive relationships with the sovereign rating, 
the size of the bank and profitability factors. Banks 
with solicited ratings tend to be larger and in a 
stronger financial position than those with unsolic-
ited ratings and banks operating in countries with 
high sovereign ratings are also more likely to have 
non-shadow ratings (solicited ratings). Meanwhile, 
unsolicited bank ratings were found to be lower than 
the ratings of other banks. Also, asset quality ratio 
and liquidity ratio were found to negatively affect 
FBR. Pasiouras, Gaganis et al. (2006) provide addi-
tional evidence of such relationships using 2004 
data for a sample of 857 banks from 71 countries. 
Their paper examines the impact of bank regula-
tions, supervision, market structure and bank cha-
racteristics on bank ratings. The findings, control-
ling for market structure, reveal that the impacts of 
banks’ capital strength, profitability, liquidity, size 
and diversification of business and franchise power 
(expense management) on FBRs are positive (ne-
gative) and statistically significant. In addition, 
banks that are relatively more strictly controlled by 
institutional shareholders were found to obtain 
higher ratings. 
Pasiouras, Gaganis et al. (2007), using 2004 data for 
a sample of 215 Asian commercial banks, examine 
the possibility of replicating Fitch credit ratings by 
employing a multi-criteria decision aid model. Their 
empirical results reveal the significant positive im-
pacts of capital strength and liquidity on banks’ 
credit ratings. On the other hand, regulatory restric-
tions on bank activity were found to have a negative 
and significant effect. The results also show that a 
bank’s credit rating is significantly and positively 
affected by the number of institutional shareholders 
and the number of institution subsidiaries. The rele-
vant literature discussed above demonstrates a sig-
nificant association between bank ratings and finan-
cial characteristics. These two dimensions have not 
been studied extensively for the Middle East region, 
however, and the relationships between bank credit 
ratings, bank capital structures and bank ratings 
have not been examined at all for the Middle East. 
This emphasizes the importance of the current study 
in addressing this research gap. 
2. Research methodology and data collection 
Based on our review of the relevant literature, the 
following alternative research hypotheses were de-
veloped in order to investigate whether a bank’s 
capital structure and financial indicators affect its 
ratings, namely its FSR: 
HA1: There is a positive relationship between a 
bank’s equity ratio and its FSR1. 
HA2: There is a negative relationship between a 
bank’s asset quality and its FSR. 
HA3: There is a positive relationship between a 
bank’s capital ratio and its FSR. 
HA4: There is a positive relationship between a 
bank’s profitability and its FSR. 
HA5: There is a negative relationship between a 
bank’s credit risk and its FSR. 
HA6: There is a positive relationship between a 
bank’s liquidity and its FSR. 
HA7: There is a positive relationship between a 
bank’s interest rate risk and its FSR. 
                                                     
1 Clearly, the corresponding null hypothesis (H01) is that there is a 
negative relationship between a bank’s equity ratio and its FSR, and null 
hypotheses corresponding to the subsequent hypotheses can be derived 
similarly. 
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Dependent variable. The dependent variable is the 
FSR that indicates the CI’s “opinion of the bank’s 
inherent financial strength, soundness and risk 
profile”. The rating scale is coded by assigning 
numerical values to each CI bank rating score. This 
method is common among other relevant studies 
(Poon, Firth et al., 1999; Poon and Firth, 2005; 
Pasiouras, Gaganis et al., 2006; Poon, Lee et al., 
2009). The coding system used in this paper is as 
follows: 
AAA = 19, AA+ = 18, AA = 17, AA- = 16, A+ = 
15, A = 14, A = 13, BBB+ = 12, BBB = 11,BBB =  
10, BB+ = 9, BB = 8, BB = 7, B+ = 6, B = 5, B = 4, 
C+ = 3 C = 2, C = 1, D = 0. 
Independent variables. The study aims to examine 
the relationships between FSR and both the capital 
structure and financial indicators of a bank. The 
equity ratio is a well-known proxy for a bank’s capi-
tal structure. The literature provides evidence that 
this ratio avoids distortions in the measurement of 
capital structure (Poon and Firth, 2005). The effects 
of capital structure on FSR are also influenced by 
other aspects or categories of bank performance. It 
is believed that a bank’s asset quality, liquidity, 
profitability, credit risk, interest rate risk and capital 
adequacy, as determined by CI1, all have an effect 
on FSR, since these are the major variables used by 
ratings agencies. The main independent variables 
are thus the banks’ capital structure and various 
bank financial indicators of each of the above six 
categories of performance. Each of the six catego-
ries includes various measures that are used as pre-
dictors for FSR. A description of each variable is 
given in Appendix. 
Control variables. The methodology examines the 
other factors that may have an effect on FSR. Bank 
financial performance measures are controlled for 
the following three variables: 
1. Country-specific factors (dummy). 
2. The size effect as a dummy variable (Ln As-
sets) that we classify into three size levels: 
large, medium and small-sized banks2. 
3. The time effect. 
2.1. Estimation method. The nature of the depend-
ent variable mainly necessitates the use of the mul-
tinomial logit (ML) technique. A similar, related 
technique (an order logistic regression ‘logit’) has 
been used in a number of empirical studies 
                                                     
1 This is based on the CI classification. 
2 Size reflects qualitative factors, such as geographic and product diver-
sification. 
(Eisenbeis, 1978; Zmijewski, 1983; Ederington, 1985; 
Poon, Firth et al. 1999). In this case, the data are called 
‘individual specific’. The estimation description of 
these models is as follows (Greene, 2000, p. 859): 
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The estimated equations provide a set of probabili-
ties for the J + 1 choices for a decision maker with 
characteristics iX . The estimation of the ML model 
is straightforward. Newton’s method provides a 
readily solution. The log-likelihood can be derived 
by defining, for each individual (or each subject), 
1=ijd if alternative j is chosen by individual I, and 
0 if not, for the J + 1 possible outcomes. Then for 
each i, one and only one of the ijd ’s is 1. It is worth 
noting that if the data are in the form of ratios, then 
the appropriate log-likelihood and derivatives are 
obtained just by making iji pndij = .  
The log-likelihood is a generalization of that for the 
binomial or logit model: 
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The regressors are bank’s equity ratio (proxy for 
bank’s capital structure) in addition to the financial 
indicators of bank performance that include asset 
quality, capital adequacy, credit risk, interest rate 
risk, liquidity and profitability. Dummy variables 
are assigned to assess the country, bank’s size and 
the time effects respectively. These are used as the 
factors in the estimation procedures. 
2.2. Data collection. Our overall sample consists 
of 200 commercial banks. We focus only on com-
mercial banks to avoid comparison problems be-
tween various types of bank and to provide homo-
geneity in the comparison between countries. The 
banks are from eleven countries in the Middle 
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East1, as shown in Table 1, and the data covers the 
period from 1994 to 2007. The data are obtained 
from the Bankscope database of Bureau van Dijk. 
Bankscope contains the financial statements and 
data of over 11,000 public and private banks 
worldwide. The rationale behind using the Bank-
scope database is that it presents the banks’ financial 
information using a separate data template for each 
country, thus allowing for differences in reporting 
and accounting conventions, but also converts the 
data into a global format, resulting in standard fi-
nancial ratios that can be compared across banks 
and countries, as explained by (Pasiouras, Gaganis 
et al., 2006). Out of the 200 banks in our sample, 
65 are rated by CI, and the remaining 135 non-CI 
rated banks were excluded from this study. The 
data were classified into four quartiles, using a 
simple weighted average, in order to determine the 
financial indicators associated with high versus 
low FSRs2. The first quartile corresponds to low-
rated banks and the fourth corresponds to highly-
rated banks3. 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for banks, by country 
and whether rated by CI, based on size (ln total assets) 
Country 
No. of 
commercial 
banks 
No. of 
banks with 
CI bank 
rating 
Mean size 
(total 
assets) 
Standard 
evaluation 
of size 
Bahrain 18 5 8.460 1.576 
Egypt 33 5 8.627 1.103 
Jordan 11 8 6.627 1.047 
Kuwait 9 6 9.073 0.754 
Lebanon 64 6 8.001 0.858 
Oman  11 5 7.274 0.762 
Qatar  7 4 7.628 1.129 
Saudi Arabia 12 9 9.195 0.897 
United Arab 
Emirates 20 14 7.720 1.327 
Yemen 6 2 5.460 0.683 
Iran 9 1 8.728 1.980 
Total 200 65 7.990 1.445 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for each coun-
try based on bank size, namely the natural log of 
total assets (in US dollars). It is clear that banks in 
both Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are larger in size than 
those in other countries. Meanwhile, Yemen’s banks 
are smaller than those of the other countries. Fur-
thermore, banks in Iran, Lebanon, Egypt and Bah-
                                                     
1 Israel, the Palestinian Territory, Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic 
were excluded from the sample because they do not have commercial 
banks rated by CI. 
2 It should be emphasized that ‘A+ and A’ are taken to be high ratings, 
whilst ‘BBB-, BB+, BB and BB-’ are considered low ratings. 
3 All four quartiles were used in the robustness test. 
rain have a similar average size, as do banks in the 
UAE, Qatar and Oman. 
3. Results and discussion 
Each ML run addresses one of the six categories of 
bank financial performance. The results of the six 
models are reported in Table 24. 
3.1. Proposed models. 3.1.1. Model 1: Asset qual-
ity. The final model for asset quality includes three 
significant predictors at the 99% confidence level, 
namely, ILGL, CS and LLRIL (see Appendix for 
details of the variables these abbreviations denote). 
The model is significant at the 1% level, which in-
dicates that the alternative hypothesis (HA2) is ac-
cepted. The asset quality model correctly classifies 
47.9% of the predicted FSR. Furthermore, the 
cross-classification shows that the asset quality 
category is relatively powerful in predicting a 
BBB- rating, with a 76.4% likelihood of correctly 
predicting the rating. Also, the parameter estimates 
show that the banks with BB-, BB, BB+, BBB- and 
A ratings are the most representative to the model 
and to the available data. 
3.1.2. Model 2: Capital adequacy. The capital ade-
quacy final model includes four significant predic-
tors, at different levels: ENL, EM, CS and CFNL. 
The final model is significant at the 1% level, which 
shows that the alternative hypothesis (HA3) outper-
forms the null hypothesis (H03). This model cor-
rectly classifies 66% of the predicted FSR. The 
cross-classification shows that the capital adequacy 
category is powerful in predicting both A and BB+ 
ratings, with 95.8% and 88.9% of ratings correctly 
predicted, respectively. The parameter estimates 
show that BB+ and BBB- are the ratings best repre-
sented by this model. 
3.1.3 Model 3: Credit risk. The credit risk model has 
five significant predictors, at different levels of sig-
nificance: CS, PLLE, LLRGL, RLLE and PPLTL. 
This model is significant at the 99% confidence level, 
which indicates that the null hypothesis (H05) is re-
jected in favor of the alternative hypothesis (HA5). 
The credit risk model correctly classifies 46.6% of 
the FSRs. The cross-classification shows that the 
credit risk category is relatively powerful in predict-
ing A ratings, with 90.8% correctly predicted. In 
addition, the credit risk model successfully predicts 
50% of the BB- ratings. 
                                                     
4 Detailed results of the analysis are available from the authors upon 
request. 
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Table 2. The financial indicators associated with FSR 
Variables (financial indicators) Model 1:  Asset  
Model 2: 
Capital  
Model 3: 
 Credit  
Model 4: 
Interest 
Model 5: 
Liquidity 
Model 6: 
Profitability 
Wald Chi-square       
CS  33.905*** 9.877** 49.08*** 48.72*** 22.12*** 13.86** 
LLRIL  18.966***      
ILGL  71.314***      
ENL   70.63***     
CFL   8.1*     
EM   17.91***     
PLLTL    11.4*    
PLLE    24.18***    
LLRGL    77.76***    
RLLE    27.58***    
GR     61.41***   
IBR      36.37***  
LR      40.95***  
NLDSTF      31.95***  
LADSTF      60.65***  
NIM       19.4*** 
NIEAA       22.26*** 
ROAE       17.05*** 
NOINI       18.48*** 
TME       44.35*** 
OER       13.41** 
No. of observations1 167 103 365 600 356 126 
Significance of the Model 
Chi-square 122.49*** 93.02*** 6.76 116.19*** 239.52*** 180.69*** 
Log Likelihood 471.03*** 171.35*** 952.29 2122.06*** 1018.46** 274.94*** 
R2 (Pseudo)2 53.5% 64.4% 58.9% 18% 48.2% 78.3% 
Overall classification accuracy 47.9% 66% 46.6% 25.8% 42.3% 52.4% 
Notes: The multicollinearity is addressed by examining the VIF scores. The predictors associated with VIF > 5 are excluded. Outliers 
are also excluded. *, **, and ***denotes a statistically significant difference at 10, 5 and 1 per cent level, respectively. 1The number of 
observations various across models due to missing data in Bankscope. This is mainly because Bankscope does not provide full bank 
reports for all sample banks with FSR. 2We report the value of Nagelkerke which is an adjustment to Cox and Snell measure. 
3.1.4. Model 4: Interest rate risk. The results for this 
model indicate two significant predictors: CS and 
GR. The final model is significant at the 1% level, 
showing that the alternative hypothesis (HA7) can be 
accepted. It correctly predicts 25.8% of FSRs. Like 
the capital adequacy model, the cross-classification 
shows that the interest rate risk model is also power-
ful in predicting A and BB+ ratings, with 52.8% and 
37.5% correctly classified, respectively. The pa-
rameter estimates show that B-, BB-, BBB- and A 
are best represented by this model. 
3.1.5. Model 5: Liquidity. Five significant predictors at 
the 1% level, namely CS, IBR, LR, NLDSTF and 
LADSTF, are identified in this model. The model is 
significant at the 1% level and so the alternative hy-
pothesis (HA6) is accepted. The model correctly classi-
fies 42.3% of the FSRs. Furthermore, the cross-
classification shows that liquidity is relatively power-
ful in predicting A and BB+ ratings, with 82.9% and 
50.9% correctly predicted, respectively. The parame-
ters estimates show that BB-, BB, BB+, BBB-, A and 
A+ are best represented by the model. The parameters 
of the final predictors vary in their significance across 
different ratings, except for IBR, which is statistically 
significant across all ratings. 
3.1.6. Model 6: Profitability. The final profitability 
model includes seven significant predictors, at differ-
ent significant levels: NIM, NIEAA, ROAE, NOINI, 
TME, CS and OER. The final model is significant at 
the 1% level which shows that the alternative hypothe-
sis (HA4) outperforms the null hypothesis (H04). The 
model correctly classifies 52.4% of FSRs. Further-
more, the cross-classification shows that profitability is 
relatively powerful in predicting BB-, A+, BB and A 
ratings, with 85.7%, 60%, 58.3% and 57.1% correctly 
predicted, respectively. The parameters estimates show 
that BB–, BB, BB+, BBB-, A and A+ are the ratings 
that are best represented by this model. 
Finally, it should be emphasized that bank capital 
structure (measured by the ratio of equity to total 
assets) was significant across all six categories (mo-
dels). This leads to the acceptance of the alternative 
hypothesis (HA1). 
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3.2. Testing for the Robustness of the methodology. 
Our methodology is aimed at examining the contri-
bution of each of the six performance measure to 
FSR. In order to test the robustness of the results, a 
further ML is performed on all of the performance 
measures at once. The objective is to detect the sta-
bility of the estimates of the predictors, in terms of 
the significance and trends (changes in signs) of the 
estimated coefficients, as shown in Table 3. 
These results can be interpreted as follows. 
3.2.1. Asset quality. ILGL is only robust and consis-
tent with the bank rating theory for low-rated banks 
(that is, BB- , BB, BB+ and BBB-). The positive 
sign of its estimate shows that highly-impaired loans 
are associated with low bank ratings. 
Table 3. Robust and significant financial indicators   
of FSR in the Middle East 
Ratings Determinants  Expected Observed Consistency 
ILGL  Positive Positive Consistent 
NIM  Negative Negative Consistent 7= BB_ 
NIEAA  Positive   Positive  Consistent 
ILGL Positive Positive Consistent 
LLRGL  Positive Positive Consistent 
IBR  Negative Positive Inconsistent 
CS  Negative Positive Inconsistent 
NIM  Negative Negative Consistent 
NIEAA Positive Positive Consistent 
NOINI  Negative Negative Consistent 
OER  Positive  Negative Inconsistent 
8= BB 
GR  Negative  Negative Consistent 
CS Negative Positive Inconsistent 
ILGL Positive Positive Consistent 
LLRGL Positive Positive Consistent 
IBR Negative Positive  Inconsistent 
LR  Positive Negative  Inconsistent 
NLDSTF  Positive Positive  Consistent 
9= BB+ 
NIEAA Positive  Positive  Consistent 
CS Negative Positive  Inconsistent 
ILGL Positive Positive  Consistent 
LLRGL Positive Positive  Consistent 
IBR  Negative Positive  Inconsistent 
LR Positive Negative  Inconsistent 
NLDSTF Positive Positive  Consistent 
10= BBB_ 
NIEAA Positive  Positive  Consistent 
CS (credit risk category) Positive  Positive  Consistent 
GR  Positive Positive Consistent 
CS ( Liquidity category) Positive  Negative Inconsistent 
IBR Negative Positive Inconsistent 
LR Negative Negative Consistent 
NLDSTF Negative Positive Inconsistent 
14= A 
LADSTF  Positive  Negative Inconsistent 
CS Positive  Negative  Inconsistent 
IBR Positive Positive  Consistent 
LR Negative Negative  Consistent 
NLDSTF Negative Positive  Inconsistent 
15= A+ 
LADSTF Positive  Negative  Inconsistent 
3.2.2. Credit risk. Of the five ratios in this category, 
only LLRGL is robust and consistent with the bank 
ratings theory, and only across some low-rated 
banks (namely, BB, BB+ and BBB-). The positive 
sign associated with this predictor estimate implies 
that a poor quality loan portfolio results in a low 
rating. 
3.2.3. Profitability. In this category, three financial 
indicators are robust and consistent. Firstly, NIM is 
robust and consistent with the bank rating theory for 
some low-rated banks (BB- and BB). The negative 
sign associated with this predictor can be explained 
by the fact that low-rated banks are not operating 
efficiently, and are thus generating low net interest 
margins. Consequently, this is arguably consistent 
with the results reported by Poon et al. (1999), who 
find profitability to be positively related to high 
Moody’s ratings. Secondly, NIEAA is robust and 
consistent across all low-rated banks (BB-, BB, 
BB+ and BBB-). The positive sign of its estimation 
indicates that low-rated banks are inefficient in 
managing the cost side of their performance rela-
tive to asset investment. Finally, NOINI is also 
robust and consistent with the bank rating theory 
but only for BB-rated banks. The negative sign 
associated with this predictor implies that low-
rated banks are not capable of generating income, 
even from unusual banking activities such as in-
vestment in securities. In addition, low-rated banks 
are not able to provide loans as efficiently as high-
ly-rated ones. 
3.2.4. Interest rate risk. The robustness and consis-
tency of GR is identified and reliable for two ratings 
(namely, BB and A). The negative sign associated 
with this predictor for low-rated banks (BB) shows 
that a lower interest sensitive gap ratio results in a 
low bank rating. On the other hand, the positive sign 
associated with this predictor estimate for highly-
rated banks (A) shows that a high interest sensitive 
gap ratio leads to high bank ratings. This is due to 
the fact that most of the interest sensitive assets of 
low-rated Middle Eastern banks are concentrated in 
low-quality loans while those of highly-rated banks 
are concentrated in high-quality loans. This argu-
ment is supported by the fact that the average provi-
sion of loan losses/total loans for low-rated banks 
(2.45%) is higher than that for highly-rated banks 
(0.6373%). 
3.2.5. Liquidity. Three financial indicators are iden-
tified as being robust in this category. Firstly, 
NLDSTF is robust and consistent with the bank 
rating theory for some low-rated banks (BB+ and 
BBB-). The positive sign associated with this pre-
dictor explains the relatively illiquid position of 
low-rated Middle Eastern banks. This is supported 
by the fact that highly-rated banks are characterized 
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by a portfolio of high-quality loans (i.e. the average 
growth rate of the ILGL for highly-rated banks is  
-5.27%). This can encourage highly-rated banks to 
sell more loans, disregarding the relative liquidity 
perspective. The descriptive statistics show that the 
ratio of net loans/deposits and short-term funding is 
higher for the highly-rated banks (62.77%) than for 
the low-rated ones (50.65%). Secondly, IBR is ro-
bust and consistent with the bank rating theory for 
highly-rated banks (namely, A and A+). The posi-
tive sign of its estimates shows that highly-rated 
banks are characterized by high liquidity, which 
complies with the theoretical assumption of the the-
ory. Finally, LR is also robust and consistent with 
the theory for A and A+ banks. The negative sign of 
the estimates for this predictor shows that a bank 
with low net loans to total assets ratio (i.e., a more 
liquid bank) will be assigned a higher rating. 
3.2.6. Capital adequacy. The robustness and consis-
tency of CS can be seen for A-rated banks. The pos-
itive sign of its predictor estimation implies that 
increasing a bank’s equity ratio is likely to increase 
its rating. 
Table 4. Sensitivity analysis of the consistent financial 
indicators of bank FSR in Middle East 
Predictor Lowly rated Highly rated 
Asset quality   
ILGL Positive Negative 
Credit risk   
LLRGL Positive Negative 
CS Negative Positive 
Profitability   
NIEAA Positive Negative 
NOINI Negative Positive 
Interest rate risk   
GR Negative Positive 
Liquidity    
NLDSTF Positive Negative 
IBR Negative Positive 
LR Positive Negative 
It can be concluded that our results would be quite 
beneficial for investors and bank managers, ena-
bling the latter to form their strategies. Table 4 sum-
marizes the results of the sensitivity analysis on the 
financial indicators of FSR for high- and low-rated 
banks. Five of the six categories of bank financial 
indicators are represented, showing the relationship 
between each variable and the FSR. 
Conclusion remarks and areas for future  
research 
This paper has revealed the most consistent and 
significant financial indicators that are associated 
with the ratings assigned by CI to Middle Eastern 
banks. In practice, bank managers as well as inves-
tors in these banks’ stocks need to focus upon the 
banking activities that help banks achieve high rat-
ings. Each rating agency has its own customized 
rating system, the details of which are not published. 
Practitioners as well as researchers can benefit from 
this paper as it will assist them in designing and ad-
justing bank financial strategies to enable Middle 
Eastern banks to achieve high ratings. Banks seeking 
high ratings should aim to improve their asset quality, 
profitability, liquidity and capital adequacy, while 
reducing both their credit and interest rate risk. In 
particular, Middle Eastern banks should focus on 
reducing ILGL, LLRGL, NIEAA, NLDSTF and LR, 
while increasing CS, NOINI, GR and IBR. 
Future research could extend this study in various 
directions. Firstly, sovereign and country risk rat-
ings could be used to capture important macroeco-
nomic and institutional characteristics of the Middle 
Eastern countries in this study. Secondly, financial 
indicators could be used to distinguish between 
rated and non-rated Middle Eastern banks, and to 
predict the FSRs assigned by CI using more ad-
vanced statistical techniques, such as neural net-
works and genetic programming. Finally, a com-
parison between CI’s FSR and Fitch’s individual 
bank rating could be carried out. 
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Appendix 
Table 1A. List of the bank financial indicators examined in the study 
Factors Variables 
Loan Loss Provision / Net Interest  Revenue (LLPNIR)  
Loan Loss Reserves  / Impaired Loans (LLRIL) 
Impaired Loans / Gross Loans (ILGL) 
Net Charge Off / Net Income Before Loan Loss Provision (NCONIBLLP) 
Impaired Loans / Equity (ILE)  
Asset quality 
Unreserved Impaired Loans / Equity (UILE) 
Tier 1 Ratio (TR) 
Total Capital Ratio (TCR) 
Equity / Total Assets (CS) 
Equity / Net Loans (ENL) 
Equity / Liabilities (EL) 
Equity / Deposit  & Short-Term Funding (EDSF)  
Capital Funds / Total Assets (CFTA) 
Capital Funds / Net Loans (CFNL) 
Capital Funds / Deposit & Short Term Funding (CFDSF)  
Capital Funds / Liabilities (CFL) 
Subordinated  Debt / Capital Funds (SDCF) 
Capital adequacy 
Equity Multiplier (EM) 
Net Interest Margin (NIM) 
Net Interest Income / Average Assets (NIRAA)  
Other Operating  Income / Average  Assets (OIAA) 
Non Interest Expense / Average Assets (NIEAA)  
Pre-Tax Operating Income / Average Assets (PTOIAA)  
Non Operating Items & Taxes / Average Assets (NOITAA) 
Return On Average  Assets (ROAA)  
Return On Average Equity (ROAE)  
Dividend Pay-Out (DPO) 
Income Net Of Distribution / Average Equity (INODAE) 
Non-Operating Income  / Net Income (NOINI) 
Cost To Income Ratio (CIR) 
Recurring Earning Power (REP)  
Net Profit Margin (NPM) 
Asset Utilization (AU) 
Tax Management Efficiency (TME) 
Expense Control Efficiency (ECE) 
Profitability 
Operating Efficiency Ratio (OER) 
Net Charge Off / Average Gross Loans (NCOAGL)  
Provision for Loan Losses/ Total Loans (PLLTL) 
Provisions for Loan Losses / Equity (PLLE) 
Loan Loss Reserve / Gross Loans (LLRGL)  
Credit risk  
Reserve for Loan Losses / Total Equity (RLLE) 
Interbank Ratio (IBR) 
Net Loans / Total Assets (LR)  
Net Loans / Deposit  & Short-Term Funding (NLDSTF) 
Net Loans / Total Deposit & Borrowing (NLTDB) 
Liquid Assets / Deposit & Short-Term Funding (LADSTF)  
Liquidity 
Liquid Assets / Total Deposit & Borrowing (LATDB)  
Interest rate risk Interest Sensitive Gap Ratio (GR) 
 
